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JAMES L. HUFFMAN*

Limited Prospects for Privatization of
Public Lands: Presidio and Valles
Caldera May Be as Good as It Gets
Sally Fairfax, Lauren Gwin, and Lynn Huntsinger report
interesting and revealing stories of the Presidio Trust and the Valles
Caldera National Preserve. The stories are interesting as political theater
and revealing of the likely roles for market approaches on the stage of
public lands management. Although the market is the star in the Presidio
Trust drama, its role is tightly constrained. Only time and perspective
will tell wvhether it is hero or villain. In the Valles Caldera, the market has
only a bit part.
If markets are meant to be the main plot in these two stories, in
the end there is a subplot that steals the show. While markets are
constricted in both tales and pushed to the sidelines in Valles Caldera,
decentralization of government authority emerges as a central theme in
both. Although decentralized government does not bring all of the
benefits of markets, it allows resource management decisions to be made
closer to those most directly affected.
The first act of the Valles Caldera plot is simple, and recurrent in
public lands history. Competing federal agencies covet control of land. In
the second act, however, private investors intervene by purchasing the
land in question with development in mind. Although some development takes place, in the final act the acquisitive government agency
persists and eventually acquires the land to serve as a "model for
sustainable land development and use."' Rather than integrate the land
into a larger management unit, Congress decides to pursue an experiment in public lands management and create the Valles Caldera Trust.
The Presidio's story is more complicated, although the theme of
competing government agencies is again central to the plot. As the name
suggests, the military occupied the land for many decades. It was
included in a national recreation area in the early 1970s, 2 but the military
held its ground for the most part. Then in a brief moment of selfimposed reason and discipline, Congress enacted base closure legislation
that engulfed the Presidio along with several other military
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1. Sally K. Fairfax et al., Presidio and Valles Caldera:A Preliminary Assessment of Their
Meaningfor Public Resource Management, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445,460 (2004).
2. Golden Gate National Recreation Area was established on October 27, 1972. 16
U.S.C. § 460(bb) (2000).
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establishments. 3 The scramble was on and the Presidio Trust was
created.
As Fairfax, Gwin, and Huntsinger demonstrate, these congressional inventions are trusts in name only.4 They do not have the most
basic characteristics of the traditional common law trust or of the trusts
that govern many lands managed by state governments. The fact that
these lands are to be managed in the public interest does not distinguish
them from any other public lands, so the use of the term trust is
apparently intended to convey that the management is for particular
purposes, and perhaps to underscore that the land managers will be
scrutinized with unusual attention.
The Valles Caldera and Presidio Trusts are, say Fairfax, Gwin,
and Huntsinger, "wholly owned government corporations," but "what
that means is not clear." 5 What is clear is that they are both "agenc[ies] of
the federal government" 6 as opposed to private entities in any
meaningful sense. Perhaps a good analogy is to charter schools, which
are usually created to meet a specialized need, or in response to general
dissatisfaction with the public schools. Charter schools are financed with
tax dollars but are free from some of the constraints and controls
imposed by the states and the public school bureaucracy. If they are
successful, it is usually because of the flexibility that comes with greater
local control. But they remain public schools and can be closed by the
state on a moment's notice.
Like the public schools that have suffered for decades from the
effects of school district consolidation and centralization, federal public
lands management has experienced the same limitations of centralization. The parallel is more than coincidental. In both cases there is an
inevitable tension between local and state or national interests. Total
local control came at the expense of broader interests, but in an effort to
give these interests a say, the balance has shifted almost entirely to the
center at the expense of effective and efficient management. Public
schools were originally consolidated in the name of economy but have
since become ever more centralized in the name of a standardized
curriculum. This one size fits all mentality has also pervaded public
lands management in pursuit of various national goals with little regard
for the significant differences that exist on the ground or for the impact
on local communities.

3.

DEP'T OF DEF., DEF. SEC'YS COMM'N, BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSUREs 55 (1988).

4.
5.
6.

Fairfax et al.,
supra note 1, at 466.
Id.
Id.
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At the beginning, the federal public lands were held by the
government in anticipation of privatization. But by the late nineteenth
century, a federal bureaucracy emerged to manage the expanding
withdrawals from the public domain. Central among these bureaucracies
was the Forest Service. For several decades, the National Forests had the
benefit of significant regional and local autonomy under the direction of
forest rangers who were as much a part of the local community as of a
national bureaucracy.
But beginning with the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of
1960, 7 the management of the National Forests became ever more

centralized with succeeding congressional enactments designed to serve
a variety of national objectives. The same trend has affected the Bureau
of Land Management and other federal departments with resource
management responsibilities. The National Park Service has been
affected somewhat less by the centripetal forces of federal control due to
the often unique resources of particular parks, but even the Park Service
has suffered from the narrow vision of centralization, as the emphasis by
many on protecting nature in the urban setting of the Presidio evidences.
Recognizing that there are national interests that warrant federal
involvement in resource management and even occasional dictates from
Washington, the presumption should be in favor of decentralization. The
local variation in the resources and character of public lands, the wide
array of interests in the use of those lands, the dependence of many local
communities on public lands resources, and the lessons to be learned
from comparative evaluation of alternative approaches all combine to
make significant local control a better approach in most cases. The two
cases of Valles Caldera and the Presidio suggest several challenges facing
those who would decentralize federal public lands management through
privatization, quasi-privatization, and other forms of decentralization.
Political decentralization and privatization are always difficult to
achieve. Once control over resources is vested in the federal government,
interest groups will resist any changes that threaten to diminish whatever political influence they have or hope to have. The prospect that local
communities may favor development over preservation, for example,
assures that proponents of preservation will resist any shift of authority.
Because exhaustive (one might say exhausting) planning in the context of
some variation on multiple use remains the dominant management
approach on most public lands, interest groups are likely to prefer their
chances in a political free for all to taking the risk of being cut out by a
special use designation or local control of particular lands.
7.

Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960,16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000).
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The result is that "trust" arrangements like Valles Caldera and
Presidio are most likely to arise from existing special use lands already in
federal ownership or where lands are acquired for special uses. Even
then, as in the Presidio case, there may still be interagency competition
for control combined with pressures to impose general management
formulas with little relation to the resources and land in question. The
essential point is that it will be difficult to decentralize or privatize
management of lands already subject to general legislative mandates.
Lands with narrow management mandates, particularly where,
like the Presidio, the historic purpose has been abandoned, will be more
easily carved out for special consideration. At the same time, privately
held lands like Valles Caldera are unlikely to be acquired unless for a
narrow and specific purpose. Although the various privatization
movements of the last century have gone nowhere, there is little broad
based political support for garden-variety additions to the public
domain.
While special use designation is politically necessary to
achieving decentralized management, it does limit significantly the
operation of market forces. Use-specific reserves are a contradiction of
basic market principles because they do not allow for allocation to the
most valued use, unless that use happens to coincide with the special use
designation. In the Valles Caldera case, for example, those who might
value the land for development are excluded from participating in the
market.
Market benefits might nonetheless be realized if the designated
uses are achieved with greater efficiency. Looking again to the Valles
Caldera example, if the "trust" arrangement results in greater net
benefits (in the form of timber, range, recreation, etc.) than would have
been realized by inclusion of the land in the general stock of public
lands, we might conclude that the limited market aspects of the "trust"
have been worthwhile. If we achieve greater net benefit or some
previous level of benefit at less cost, it is difficult to understand why
anyone would object.
But, as Fairfax, Gwin, and Huntsinger observe, 8 there are
objectors. It is objected that markets, and particularly profits, are not
appropriate to parks and other public lands. This view is widely held
among environmentalists and seems to be rooted in a belief that private
resource management has been the principle cause of environmental
harm and in a communitarian confidence that the public good is morally
superior to the private interest. Measuring the adequacy of public
8.

Fairfax et al., supranote 1, at 456-57.
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management against the crass and unforgiving standards of markets is
thought to demean the public ends sought to be served.
We might debate whether the public good is of a higher order,
but even accepting that the public good is nothing more than an
aggregation of private goods, there can be little argument that, in at least
some circumstances, net social welfare will be maximized through public
management. Acknowledging that public control will sometimes yield
greater aggregate benefits than will private management does not argue,
however, against reliance on market mechanisms where they yield
greater net benefits. So the objection to profits in the parks comes down
(rises up?) to a moral argument and nothing more (or less?). Beyond
trying to persuade market antagonists that they have it wrong on the
moral question, there is little to say, although those claiming a moral
high ground must be prepared to acknowledge the costs to individuals
of inefficient resource allocations.
If our goal is efficient resource allocation and not some different
or higher public good, the Presidio model is superior to the Valles
Caldera trust. The Presidio Trust must be self-sufficient at a date certain.
If it is not, the land and improvements are to be transferred to the
General Services Administration for disposal. Prior to the date certain,
the Presidio resources are not subject to the full price-clearing forces of
the market because only some uses are permitted, but if by that date the
Trust is not self-sustaining (and assuming Congress does not intervene),
the full forces of the market come into play. Under these circumstances
(assuming the Trust managers do not anticipate congressional
intervention), the incentives to achieve self-sufficiency are very real.
While the limits on acceptable resource uses disadvantage the
managers in the market, there are significant benefits to being a
government corporation, not the least of which are being exempt from
taxation and possibly from some regulations. As long as these market
distortions exist there is no way of knowing whether the Presidio Trust
will be truly self-sufficient when government subsidies are finally cut off,
but at least there is a level of inefficiency below which the Trust will not
be permitted to fall. At that point, all of the market distortions disappear
and the resources become available to the highest bidder.
If efficient resource allocation is our objective, the Presidio Trust
model will work in the long run. However, if preservation of some or all
of the existing resource uses at the Presidio is our objective, the model is
a risky one. It is possible that the threat of sale at a date certain will lead
to more effective management, and the generation of revenues will
provide some of what is needed to run the place, but if Congress really
means to turn it all over to the real estate folks at the General Services
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Administration if self sufficiency is not achieved, there is a good chance
the Presidio will not be preserved.
With respect to the Presidio, Fairfax, Gwin, and Huntsinger state
that "[tihere is a risk that preservation and public access will be
compromised as the Board pursues... [self-sufficiencyl." 9 This suggests
that preservation is the real goal, in which case the prospect of sale is
largely empty. The government has abandoned very few preservation
efforts even where management has been detrimental to the protected
resources. If Congress is open to reconsideration when it appears the
Presidio Trust is not achieving self-sufficiency, the pressures to extend
the subsidies or amend the legislation will be even more intense than
those that accompanied the enactment of the original legislation.
The Valles Caldera model is better suited to preservation, while
still gaining some of the benefits of markets and decentralized management. Because the Valles Caldera managers are not permitted to fail,
their incentives to achieve self-sufficiency are limited. Their prospects for
self-sufficiency are further dimmed by the smorgasbord of objectives
they are expected to achieve and the constituency of the board, which
has more to do with the representation of political interests than the
management of natural resources. Indeed, there is much about the Valles
Caldera "trust" that resembles the failed multiple use model that has
dominated public lands management for the past half century. The fact
that it is a decentralized version of multiple use, combined with its
authorization to engage in market transactions for the use of its
resources, makes it a useful experiment in public resource management.
But it remains, as Fairfax, Gwin, and Huntsinger conclude, an agency of
the federal government subject to the ambiguous constraints of multiple
use management.
That is probably as it should be given the objectives set forth in
the organic legislation.10 One of the purposes of the Valles Caldera Trust
is "to promote long term financial sustainability consistent with the other
purposes of this act,"" which are the multiple uses referred to above. In
authorizing the exchange of services, the Act calls for the optimization of
"the generation of income based on existing market conditions, to the
extent that it does not unreasonably diminish the long-term scenic and
natural values of the area, or the multiple use and sustained yield
capability of the land." 12 Self-sufficiency is clearly not the core objective.
9.
10.
11.
12.
(2000).

Id. at 470.
Va~les Caldera Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 698v (2000).
Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 461. See 16 U.S.C. § 698v(b)(4) (2000).
Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 462 (emphasis added). See 16 U.S.C. § 698v-6(d)(6)
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If preservation of the many values thought to exist on the land is the
objective, as it appears to be, the Presidio model would not be
acceptable.
Fairfax, Gwin, and Huntsinger suggest that "sacred shrines" like
Faneuil Hall, Mount Vernon, and Fort Ticonderoga might be successfully
preserved by entirely private means, but private preservation on a larger
scale seems unlikely. 13 Markets are, by nature, dynamic. Preservation is
by definition static, and therefore only assured by government, either
through ownership or regulation. Beyond the foregoing observations
about the politics of public lands privatization and the narrow prospects
it holds for preservation efforts in particular, the Presidio Trust and
Valles Caldera cases suggest a few other general conclusions. First, there
are potential efficiency gains even where so-called private approaches
are really only decentralized public entities. The hesitancy to truly
privatize these public resources merely confirms that, while we seek
to
some of the allocational efficiency benefits of the market, we also want
14
preserve at least some of the distributional possibilities of politics.
Second, concerns about wealth distribution are always present,
though often unspoken, in public lands politics and proposals for
privatization or decentralization. Whether the disagreement is between
national and local interests, one federal agency and another, or
development and preservation advocates, it is usually more about
wealth distribution than efficient resource allocation. The only time the
wealth distribution aspect of public lands politics surfaces is when it
appears that bringing profit to the parks will exclude low income users
of the parks. Because this legitimate concern is easily remedied by
means-tested subsidies, it is not unfair to conclude that even in these
situations rent seeking is the best explanation for public lands politics.
Finally, we might identify several factors that augur against
privatization of public land resources:
o Private resource owners may resist privatization to the
extent public resources are being held out of the market
and thus making the privately held resources more
valuable.
* Resource developers may resist privatization if public
resources are made available at subsidized cost as, for
example, with public grazing lands.
13. Fairfax et al., supranote 1,at 470-71.
14. The "we" I refer to in this statement is that reflected by the outcomes of existing
public lands politics. I do not intend to suggest that those political outcomes can be
defended on other than empirical grounds.
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* Beyond the simple rent seeking of public lands politics,
there does appear to be a widely held belief that profit in
the parks is inappropriate, if not immoral. The oft repeated
notion that "the public lands are our lands" is a powerful
factor in public lands politics.
* Since the creation of the very first forest reserves, there
has been strong resistance to special use withdrawals
because of lost private development opportunities. While
this concern does not argue against true privatization, it
does lead to opposition in cases like the Presidio and Valles
Caldera where permitted uses are limited.
* Concerns for good stewardship (which Fairfax, Gwin,
and Huntsinger express15 ) tend to favor public resource
management because those expressing the concern have a
particular objective in mind, which is usually not wellmanaged or even sustainable commercial use.

15.

Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 464.

